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ABSTRACT 
It is shown that unrenormalized plausibility functions, interpreted as measures of 
the impact of contrary evidence, satisfy the axioms for local computation proposed 
by Shenoy and Shafer. It is argued that in cases where the underlying domain is 
generated as the union of singletons representing most specific descriptions, plausi- 
bility functions rather than belief functions are the natural measures of uncertainty. 
In those cases, decision should be made on the basis of the ratios of plausibility 
values. The latter are unaffected by renormalization, which is superfluous. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Prakash P. Shenoy and Glenn Shafer present axioms in [1] that allow for 
local computation i  hypertrees. The axioms are satisfied both for Bayesian 
probabilities and for belief functions, as well as for a variety of other structures 
(Shafer and Shenoy [2]). The aim of this note is to show that they are also 
satisfied for plausibility functions. 
From one point of view this follows from Shenoy and Shafer's work on belief 
functions. But the purpose of working directly with plausibility functions is to 
provide a basis for the following claims. 
• In situations considered by Shenoy and Shafer, mathematical and evidential 
priority should be given to plausibility functions. Belief functions are of 
less importance. 
• Renormalization fplausibility functions is neither necessary nor desirable. 
An interpretation f plausibility functions as measures of the impact of contrary 
evidence is presented in Section 4.2. 
In Section 2 we present he axioms for local computation. In Section 3 we 
present he interpretation i terms of plausibility functions. In Section 4 we 
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discuss the interpretation f plausibility functions and questions of renormaliza- 
tion. 
AXIOMS FOR LOCAL COMPUTATION 
The axioms proposed by Shenoy and Shafer [1] refer to objects called valu- 
ations and operations called marginalization and combination. 
Valuations. Let ~C be a finite set. For each h C_ ~E there is a set 'Vh of 
valuations over h. Let ~ = U {"Oh Ih c_ ~E } denote the set of all valuations. 
Marginalization. For each g C_ 9C there is a mapping Sg: 
U {~h Ig C_ h } ~ 'Vg called marginalization to g such that if H is a valuation 
over h and g c_ h, then H ~g is a valuation over g representing the marginal of  
H over g. 
Combination. There is a mapping ~:  a7 x ~ ~ ~ called combination 
such that if G and H are valuations over g and h, respectively, then G ® H is 
a valuation over g U h representing the combination o f  G and H. Marginal- 
ization and combination are to satisfy the following axioms: 
AxioM 0 I f  H C ~h,  then H ~h = H.  
Axiom 1 I f  HErb  and g l C_ g2 C_ h, then H lg~ = (H ~g2 ) ~g' .
AyaoM 2 G ®H -- H ®G and G ®(H ®K)  = (G ®H)  ®K for  all 
G ,H ,  K c~.  
Axiom 3 I f  G C "Vg and H E ~h, then (G OH)  zg =G ®(H~g~).  
The basis for local computation i Shenoy and Shafer's cheme is provided by 
Axiom 3. We now show that these axioms are satisfied by plausibility functions. 
PLAUSIBIL ITY FUNCTIONS 
Following the notation and terminology of Shenoy and Shafer [1], we define 
plausibility functions in terms of random subsets. But there are two points of 
difference. First we define plausibility functions directly rather than by way 
of belief functions and complements. This means that the relation between a 
plausibility function and its density, or basic probability assignment, differs 
from that described by Shafer in [3], for example. Second, we do not impose 
any renormalization on plausibility functions. 
Random subsets. Let 'W be a finite set. We write (P('W) for the set of all 
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subsets or power set of "W. A random subset 8 of "W is a probability density 
on (P('W). The weight attached to a subset A of "W is written as Pr[8 = A]. We 
also write Pr[A c_ 8] -- ~A c_B Pr[8 ---- B] for the probability that A is included 
in 8. Thus Pr [~ C_ 8] : 1 for every random subset $ of "W. If $ and 3 are 
random subsets of "W, we write 8 t3 3 for the random subset whose density is 
given by 
Pr [SU3=A]= Z Pr [$=B]Pr [3=C]  
A =B UC 
Plausibility functions. A real-valued function P on the power set of a finite 
set "W is called a plausibility function if there exists a random subset 8 of "W 
such that P(A) = 1 - Pr[A C_ 8] for every subset A of "W. The random subset 
corresponding to a plausibility function is necessarily unique. 
Now let ~E be a finite set and let ('wx)xc~c be a collection of finite sets 
indexed by the elements of ~E. Elements of ~C are thought of as variables, with 
"wx as the range of possible values for the variable X. For each subset h of ~E, 
let "wh be the product of ('wx)xsh in the category of sets. l For each subset 
h of ~E we interpret he set 'Vh of valuations over h as the set of plausibility 
functions on (P('Wh). We also refer to these as plausibility functions over h. 
Marginalization. If g c h c 9C and G is a subset of 'We, let G Th be the 
subset of 'Wh defined by G Th = G x %Vh-g. Now suppose that P E ~h so 
that P is a plausibility function over h. Then if g C_ h, the so-called marginal 
of P over g, denoted by ptg, is just the restriction of P to the power set 
of "wg along the canonical embedding Th: <P('We)~ (P('Wh). Explicitly, pig 
is defined for each subset G of 'W e by P~g(G) = P(GTh). To see that this 
is a plausibility function over g, define H lg for each subset H of "wh by 
H lg --- [.J {G C_ %Vg IG Th C_ H}. Thus H lg is the largest cylinder with base in 
"wg that is contained in H. 2 Then if P corresponds to the random subset 8h of 
"wh, the marginal P~g corresponds to the random subset 8~ e of ~Wg. Explicitly 
Pie(G) = 1 - Pr[G x %Vh_g C_ $] for every subset G of 'W e. 
Combination. Suppose g, h c_ ~ and that Pg and Ph are plausibility func- 
tions over g and h corresponding to the random subsets 8g of 'Wg and 8h of 
%Vh. Then the combination of Pg and Ph is the plausibility function Pg ® Ph 
over g U h corresponding to the random subset $~guh t_J ~guh of %Vguh. 
Ilf h = ~,  then %Vh is a terminal object, the singleton {~}, say. Otherwise 'Wh is just the Cartesian 
product of the sets %Vx for X c h. We avail ourselves of the liberty to choose limits in such a way that 
"Wh × 'W 0 = 'W~ × 'Wh = %V^  with the obvious projections--the identity in one direction and the unique map 
in the other. 
2Shenoy and Shafer use the notation HiS for the set n {G _c 'Wg [H c_ G l"h }. This and the map defined in 
the text are, respectively, left and right adjoint to the lattice homomorphism Th. 
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It is straightforward to verify that marginalization and combination satisfy 
Axioms 0-2. We content ourselves with a sketch of the proof that they also 
satisfy Axiom 3. Suppose that g, h c_ ~ and that Pg E ~Tg and Ph E %9h are 
plausibility functions corresponding to the random subsets 8g and 8h of ~Tg and 
'Wh, respectively. Then for each subset A of ~dTg we have 
whereas 
(-lag OPh)~g(A) = 1 -- Pr[A Tg~ C__gR TgUh (_J Sh ~gUh] 
= 1 -- ar[A _C ($gTg~ U sTguh)~g] 
Pg ® (P~gr~)(A) = 1 - Pr[A c_ Sg U ($~gnh) T*] 
so we need to show that ($grguh U $~guh)~g = 8g U ($~'~)Tg or that 
(G x "~Th-g U 'Wg-h x H)  lg = G U 'Wg-h x H lgc'~ 
for all G C_ 'Wg and H C_ %Vh. It is not difficult to see that this is an instance 
of the following equivalence of the classical predicate calculus, 
Vz(Axy V Byz) -- Axy V VzByz 
in which x,  y ,  z are any variables used A, B are any binary relational symbols. 
COMMENTS 
We now comment on the relation between plausibility functions and belief 
functions, the evidential interpretation of plausibility functions, and the question 
of renormalization. 
Belief Functions 
Apart from the matter of renormalization, every plausibility function in the 
present sense is a plausibility function in the sense of [3]. In [3] and subse- 
quent treatments, however, plausibility functions are defined in terms of belief 
functions and complements. To see the connection when we are dealing with 
power sets, let $ be a random subset of 'W. 8 is said to be a random nonempty 
subset if Pr[8 = 0] = O. A function Bel on the power set of 'W is said to be 
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a belief unction if there exists a random nonempty subset $ of ~dg such that 
BeI(A) = Pr[8 C_ A] for every subset A of ~ .  Then the plausibility function P1 
corresponding toBel is defined for every subset A o f 'W by PI(A) -- 1 -Bel(AC), 
where A ¢ is the set-theoretic complement of A. Clearly this is the plausibility 
• • C 
function m our present sense that corresponds to the random subset 8 . Con- 
versely, if P is a plausibility function based on a random subset 8 of ~ for 
which Pr[8 = ~V] = 0, then P is exactly the plausibility function in Shafer's 
s c" original sense that corresponds to the belief function based on Moreover, 
this relation between plausibility functions in the two senses is preserved un- 
der combination and marginalization--the r ason for the latter being that Th 
preserves complements• 
Evidence 
The relation between belief functions and evidence is understood in [1], for 
example, as follows: 
Intuitively, the number BeI(A) is the degree to which we judge given 
evidence to support he proposition that the true value of [a given] vari- 
able is in A, or the degree to which we think it reasonable to believe 
this proposition on the basis of that evidence alone. 
The idea is that Bel(A) is 0 by default unless A = "~ and that it increases only 
with the accumulation of evidence in favor of A. 
But there is no a priori reason why we should think of favorable vidence as 
the norm. We can equally regard contrary evidence as the norm. 3 This is how 
plausibility functions are to be understood. If P is a plausibility function, then 
P(A) is 1 by default, unless A = 0, and it decreases only with the accumulation 
of evidence against A. The empty set corresponds to the impossible proposi- 
tion against which we always have conclusive vidence• The top element--the 
whole set--has no special status. It represents the proposition that the currently 
considered range of values is exhaustive. We may acquire evidence against his 
proposition either directly or by a combination of items of evidence ach weigh- 
ing against an element of a collection of propositions whose disjunction or union 
is the whole set. 
For power set domains there is a simple mathematical relation between these 
points of view. Where we say we have an item of evidence weighing against 
A to degree/3, one could say that there is an item of evidence weighing to the 
same degree in favor of A c. The first way of speaking leads to a plausibility 
function P corresponding, in our sense, to the random subset Pr[$ -- A] = ~, 
3Karl Popper [4] emphasizes the primary role of contrary evidence or falsification in the context of theory 
evaluation. 
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Pr[$ = 0] -- 1 - 3. The second way leads to a belief function Bel corresponding 
to 8c. The two functions are related in the way described in Section 4.1. 
Shafer [5] compares the impact of an item of evidence to the receipt of a 
randomly coded message. In the simplest case, an item of evidence weighing to 
degree 3 in favor of the nonempty subset A corresponds to a message that has 
a chance 3 of meaning that the truth lies in A and a chance 1 - 3 of meaning 
nothing--where meaning nothing is equated with meaning that the truth lies in 
the whole set 'W. 
We can tell a similar story for plausibility functions in our sense. An item 
of evidence weighing against a proposition A to degree 3 corresponds to a 
message that has a chance 3 of meaning that the truth does not lie in A and a 
chance 1 - 3 of meaning nothing, that is, that the truth does not lie in 0. 
Whereas there is agreement that the truth cannot lie in the empty set, we 
cannot agree with the intuition of the theory of belief functions that it means 
nothing to say that the truth lies in %V. 
Renormalization 
A plausibility function P on the power set of %V, as defined in Section 
3, must satisfy P(0) = 0, whereas P(XV) can take any value between 0 and 
1. Plausibility functions can be renormalized, however, like belief functions. 
Using our previous notation we have the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 1 I f  P is a plausibility function on the power set o f  ~ ,  
then so is hP, where ~ is any real number satisfying 0 < ~ < P('~V) -1 . 
If P('W) > 0, we may choose X -- p ( ,~) - i  to obtain a plausibility function for 
which P(%V) = 1. In any case the ratios o f  plausibilities are unaffected by 
renormalization. 
Renormalization commutes with marginalization a d, in an appropriate sense, 
with combination. This means that we may restrict attention to normalized 
plausibility functions if we choose, renormalizing after combination if necessary. 
But why should we insist on renormalizing plausibility functions? There is no 
mathematical reason for doing so. It is true that additive probability measures 
on Boolean algebras assign the extreme values of 0 and 1 to the bottom and top 
elements of the lattice. But we are not dealing with additive measures, nor is 
it correct o think of the domains of plausibility or belief functions as Boolean 
algebras. If it were, we should be using additive Bayesian measures. We should 
think of them as semilattices (Williams [6])--specifically as join semilattices 
in the present context. While the bottom element of a join semilattice has a 
distinguished role as the empty join, the top element--the whole set in our 
case--has none. There is no reason why a plausibility function should assign it 
a distinguished value. 
The situation is different if we give priority to belief functions. In that case, 
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when it is presumably our intention to base decisions on degrees of belief 
rather than plausibilities, it is clear that some form of adjustment is necessary. 
Consider the following example. Suppose the variable X is assumed to take 
on just one of the two values x0 and xl and that we have n + 1 independent 
items of evidence supporting {x0 } each to degree/3 and a further n independent 
items of evidence ach supporting {Xl } also to degree/3. Assume 0 </3 < 1. 
Clearly the evidence is in favor of {x0} on balance, and the intuition that n 
of the items on either side cancel out, as it were, tells us that the balance is 
the same whatever the value of n. But if we deal with unrenormalized belief 
functions, the combined egrees of belief for {x0 } and {Xl } both tend to 1 so 
that, as n increases, their ratio tends to 1 and their difference to 0. This means 
that neither the ratio nor the difference of unrenormalized degrees of belief can 
discriminate between the hypotheses in a way that does justice to our intuition. 
Suppose instead we renormalize the combined belief functions. Writing c~ -- 
l - /3 ,  we find that as n increases the degrees of belief for {x0} and {Xl } 
tend to 1/(1 +c~) and ct/(1 +ct), respectively--a Bayesian distribution, in fact. 
The limit 1/c~ for the ratio is reasonable enough, though one wonders why it is 
necessary to wait for the limit before arriving at this conclusion. 4 
Consider now the plausibilities of the two hypotheses. As explained in Sec- 
tion 4.2, we can either work with the corresponding plausibility functions in 
Shafer's sense or we can retell the story in terms of negative vidence. The 
numerical results will be the same. In the second case we should say that there 
are n items of evidence against {x0 } and n + 1 items against {Xl }. Having set 
renormalization aside, the plausibilities of {x0} and {Xl } will be just c~ n and 
c~ n+l. The ratio of plausibilities is 1/c~ whatever the value of n. There seems 
little purpose in renormalizing. We are always at liberty to pay attention to 
the ratios P(A)/P(%V) if we wish. 5 Renormalizing amounts to discarding the 
information contained in the plausibility of the top element, which, although it 
has no effect on the plausibility ratios, might nonetheless be significant o the 
overall decision. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the situations dealt with in [1] are ones in which the frame for 
each variable is freely generated as the lattice of joins of the variable's range of 
possible values. In such cases belief functions are of doubtful mathematical or
evidential significance. (It is argued in [6] that belief functions are appropriate 
4Since the ratio is infinite in the case n = 0, it is doubtful whether one could work with ratios of degrees of 
belief in general. 
5For example, we may decide to "reject" a hypothesis A if P(A)/P(W) is sufficiently small--though there is 
little to recommend such a rule. It would correspond to "accepting" a hypothesis if its renormaIized degree of 
belief is sufficiently large--a rule that is proposed by Shafer et al [7], for example. 
232 Peter M. Williams 
when the frame is freely generated as the meets of its generators.) We propose 
instead that the natural measure of uncertainty in these cases is a plausibility 
function and that the way to reach decisions is on the basis of the ratios of 
plausibility values. 
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